INDUSTRY FACT FILE · DRONES, ROBOTICS & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

Threat Landscape: Top Cyber Threats Facing Drone and Robotics Businesses

The 18 most relevant cyber threats, attacks and industry challenges for drone and component makers, drone operators, robotics and warehouse automation firms, autonomous delivery businesses and fleet software providers, and the impact each has.

Drone and robotics businesses face attackers with very different aims. Criminal groups use ransomware against manufacturers, integrators and software platforms because downtime in production, delivery or a customer's warehouse creates pressure to pay. Espionage actors seek designs, flight code, AI models and imagery of sensitive sites, and are interested in where drones fly and what they see. Opportunistic attackers scan the internet for exposed fleet consoles, robot controllers, remote desktop services and storage buckets. Researchers and hobbyists find flaws in pairing, links and firmware, which become public quickly. Insiders and contractors with shared pilot or administrator accounts can misuse fleets and data. Satellite navigation can be degraded or falsified by interference that operators do not control, and hostile use of drones themselves, as in the June 2021 attack on the Air Force Station in Jammu that the NIA investigated, has made security agencies and critical sites more cautious about who flies near them.

Public reporting shows how these risks are moving. DGCA issued an advisory circular on GNSS interference in November 2023 after reports over West Asian airspace, and in December 2025 the government confirmed GPS spoofing near Delhi's airport and interference reports from six other major Indian airports, directed the Wireless Monitoring Organisation to trace sources and issued a reporting procedure. In September 2025 researchers disclosed a Bluetooth setup flaw in four commercial quadruped and humanoid robot models that allowed nearby attackers to run code with full privileges. Governments are acting on supply chain concerns: India restricted Chinese-made components in military drones according to Reuters, US agencies issued guidance in 2024, and the US FCC added foreign-produced drones and critical components to its Covered List in December 2025. Each of these turns into questions from customers, regulators and investors about firmware, links, navigation, fleet platforms and data.

The list below is a practical assessment framework, not a statistical ranking. Priority varies by business model, technology exposure and existing controls.

The matrix is a qualitative guide for prioritising the first round of security reviews.

Figure 5: Qualitative threat relevance by drone, robotics and autonomy segment (Codec Networks assessment).

4.1 Firmware, updates and the build pipeline

The most efficient way to compromise a fleet is through its updates. A manufacturer that signs firmware with a key stored on a build server, or whose drones and robots accept unsigned or downgraded images, gives anyone who breaches that server a route to every unit in the field. Hardware debug ports left open on production boards and component firmware from suppliers without update or vulnerability processes add to the risk. Because these devices move, a tampered update can cause safety incidents as well as data theft.

• Questions to test: Where are signing keys held, and who can use them? Do devices reject unsigned and rolled-back firmware at boot? Are updates staged and watched in telemetry before full release? Are debug interfaces locked on production units? Do suppliers patch their components?
• Relevant services: firmware and secure boot review, update signing and pipeline review, hardware interface testing, supplier and SBOM assessments, and incident response for update compromise.

4.2 Links, ground stations and fleet consoles

Command, telemetry and video links, the apps that plan and fly missions and the cloud consoles that manage fleets are the control path of every drone and robot. Weak pairing, unencrypted links, unmanaged pilot phones, shared accounts and exposed consoles let attackers watch, interfere with or redirect operations. Fleet platforms concentrate this risk: one stolen administrator credential or broken API check can affect every customer and every vehicle on the platform.

• Questions to test: Are links encrypted and mutually authenticated? Are ground station devices managed and hardened? Is every console account named and protected with MFA? Is tenant isolation tested in every release? Would we notice an unusual mission change or geofence edit within minutes?
• Relevant services: link and RF security testing, ground control app and device testing, fleet cloud and API VAPT, cloud configuration and identity review, and managed SOC monitoring of consoles and telemetry.

4.3 Navigation resilience under interference

Satellite navigation is a shared, external dependency. DGCA's circular describes how jamming can deny position information and spoofing can supply false positions, and Indian airports reported both kinds of interference in 2025. Delivery, inspection and BVLOS drones need to detect when position is unreliable, cross-check with inertial, visual or other sensors and fall back to safe behaviour. These defences can only be verified through authorised testing in controlled environments, coordinated with the customer and any required regulatory permissions.

• Questions to test: How heavily do our drones depend on a single navigation source? Do they detect position jumps and integrity loss? Are fail-safes, geofences and return behaviours tested and documented? Do pilots know how to report interference? Do our logs preserve evidence of what happened?
• Relevant services: authorised navigation resilience testing in controlled environments, sensor cross-check and fail-safe design review, flight log and evidence review, and operator awareness and reporting playbooks.

4.4 Robot cells, AMR fleets and vendor access

Robotics deployments connect robot controllers, safety systems, fleet managers and warehouse systems on networks that were often designed for convenience. Middleware such as ROS can accept commands from any node on the network if it is not secured, robots may expose services over Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, and vendors keep remote support tunnels to tune fleets. Ransomware on a fleet management server or a phished support account can halt a warehouse or a production line, and unsafe commands can damage equipment.

• Questions to test: Are robot networks segmented from office and warehouse IT? Are ROS and controller interfaces authenticated and restricted? Is vendor access named, time-bound, recorded and protected with MFA? Can we rebuild a fleet manager from tested backups? Have we mapped zones and conduits under IEC 62443?
• Relevant services: OT and robot cell assessments aligned with IEC 62443, AMR fleet and ROS exposure reviews, vendor remote access review, backup and recovery testing, and SOC monitoring of remote sessions.

4.5 Data, imagery and supply chain trust

Survey and inspection imagery shows critical sites, operating details and people, and flight data reveals where and when operators fly. Shared folders, laptops and client portals often hold it with weak controls, which creates DPDP exposure and worries for utility and government clients. Supply chain trust is the other side of the same question: buyers and foreign regulators increasingly ask where components, SDKs and cloud services come from and where data flows, and makers must be able to answer with evidence.

• Questions to test: Do we know where all imagery and flight data is stored and who can reach it? Are people blurred or minimised where possible? Do client contracts define retention and handling? Do we hold SBOMs and provenance records for components and SDKs? Are hidden data flows tested?
• Relevant services: cloud storage and data handling review, DPDP programme for imagery and pilot data, supply chain and component provenance assessment, firmware data flow analysis and supplier assurance.

• CERT-In: incidents reported within six hours of noticing them; logs kept for 180 days in India and available for investigation; CERT-In may issue directions and advisories.
• DGCA and the Drone Rules: safety occurrences, unauthorised operations and compromised records can lead to scrutiny of permissions, certificates and type certification; GNSS interference is reported under DGCA procedures.
• Customers and tenders: utilities, government buyers and enterprises can suspend contracts or disqualify suppliers after incidents or provenance concerns.
• Law enforcement: misuse of drones, intrusions and data theft lead to police complaints and requests for flight logs and evidence.
• DPDP Act: breach intimation and safeguards for personal data in imagery and records once provisions commence; SEBI LODR disclosure for listed makers.
• Export markets: products sold in the EU face CRA vulnerability and incident reporting from September 2026; US authorisation rules affect drones and critical components.

• If our build or update server were breached, could it push malicious firmware to the fleet?
• Who can reach our fleet consoles, robot controllers and vendor support tunnels today, and with what authentication?
• Have our navigation fail-safes been verified through authorised testing in controlled environments?
• Do we know where every set of imagery and flight data is stored, and who can access it?
• Can we prove where our components, SDKs and cloud services come from when a buyer asks?
• Could we detect, contain and report a fleet or robot incident within six hours, including at night?

Note: Threat descriptions and relevance ratings are general guidance, not findings about any specific organisation or product. Public incident references are summarised from official statements and widely reported events. Navigation threats are described only at the level needed to explain defences, and testing is described only as authorised testing in controlled environments, coordinated with the customer and any required regulatory permissions.