INDUSTRY FACT FILE · RENEWABLE ENERGY & ENERGY STORAGE

Five New Case Studies in Renewable Energy Security

Original 2026 case studies, each written as a blog post, showing how current threats play out for renewable, storage and metering operators and how Codec Networks services break the attack chain.

In this document 1.  About these case studies 2.  Case Study 1: The Wind Farm That Lost Its Link 3.  Case Study 2: The Inverter Portal Everyone Shared 4.  Case Study 3: The Rogue Radio in the Inverter 5.  Case Study 4: The Battery System on the Open Internet 6.  Case Study 5: The Smart Meter Update That Went Wrong

These five case studies were written for this document set and have not been published elsewhere. Each is a composite scenario combining attack techniques and control failures widely observed in renewable energy, storage and metering with the obligations that apply in India as of October 2026—in particular the CEA (Cyber Security in Power Sector) Regulations, 2026 (as reported), CERT-In's Directions and the DPDP framework.

Important disclosure The organisations described are fictional and the scenarios are illustrative. They are not accounts of real incidents, and they are not Codec Networks client engagements or claims of achieved outcomes. Their value lies in showing how connected weaknesses form an attack chain, which controls break it, and which services test those controls.

Case study	Organisation type	Core threat	Regulatory lens	Primary bundles
1. The Wind Farm That Lost Its Link	Wind portfolio operator	Third-party connectivity disruption	CEA Regulations; contracts	B3, B9, B10
2. The Inverter Portal Everyone Shared	Solar IPP	Shared OEM portal credentials	CEA Regulations; CERT-In	B3, B9, B7
3. The Rogue Radio in the Inverter	Renewable developer	Undocumented communication module	CEA Regulations; procurement	B1, B9, B5
4. The Battery System on the Open Internet	Battery storage operator	Exposed EMS with default credentials	CEA Regulations; CERT-In	B1, B3, B7
5. The Smart Meter Update That Went Wrong	Smart meter service provider	Tampered unsigned firmware update	DISCOM contracts; DPDP; CERT-In	B2, B1, B8

The turbines kept turning. Nobody could see them.

At a glance
Organisation	A wind portfolio operator (“Windco A”) with remote sites
Threat	An attack on a satellite communications provider disabling site terminals
Why it is new	Remote fleets depend on third-party links
Codec Networks services	Connectivity resilience, third-party assessment, resilience exercises (Bundles B3, B9, B10)

The scenario

Windco A relied on a single satellite service for remote monitoring of its turbines.

An attack on the provider disabled user terminals across many customers, including Windco A.

Turbines continued operating safely, but remote monitoring and control were lost for weeks, forcing costly site visits.

Figure 8: Illustrative attack path for Case Study 1 and the controls that break it.

What went wrong

• One connectivity provider for all sites.
• The provider's resilience was never assessed.
• Loss-of-telemetry procedures were untested.
• No backup links for critical sites.

The impact

Windco A faced operating costs, reduced visibility and contractual discussions with its provider.

The regulatory lens

• CEA Regulations 2026 (as reported): crisis management planning and resilience for covered entities.
• Grid coordination: obligations to support scheduling and forecasting.
• Contracts: connectivity provider service levels.

How Codec Networks would help

Need	Codec Networks response	Bundle
Diversify links	Connectivity resilience review	B3
Assess providers	Third-party connectivity assessment	B9
Rehearse	Loss-of-telemetry exercises	B10

Key lessons Use diverse connectivity. Assess link providers. Plan safe local operation. Rehearse telemetry loss.

One password controlled three plants.

At a glance
Organisation	A solar IPP (“Solarco B”) using an OEM cloud portal for its inverters
Threat	A phished shared admin login used to curtail output across plants
Why it is new	OEM clouds can command entire fleets
Codec Networks services	Vendor cloud review, OEM assessment, command monitoring (Bundles B3, B9, B7)

The scenario

Solarco B's site teams and an O&M contractor shared one admin login to the inverter OEM's cloud portal, without MFA.

The password was phished. An attacker logged in and reduced output limits across three plants.

Generation dropped for hours before the change was noticed, triggering PPA penalties.

Figure 9: Illustrative attack path for Case Study 2 and the controls that break it.

What went wrong

• A shared admin account without MFA.
• No approval for fleet-wide changes.
• Portal commands were not monitored.
• The OEM cloud was never assessed.

The impact

Solarco B lost revenue, faced PPA penalties and had to report the incident.

The regulatory lens

• CEA Regulations 2026 (as reported): incident reporting within six hours, vendor accountability and OT protection.
• CERT-In Directions: incident reporting.
• PPA terms: availability obligations.

How Codec Networks would help

Need	Codec Networks response	Bundle
Lock the portal	Named accounts, MFA and approvals review	B3
Assess the OEM	Vendor cloud security assessment	B9
Watch commands	Monitoring of fleet commands	B7

Key lessons Give every user a named account. Enforce MFA on OEM portals. Approve fleet-wide changes. Monitor portal commands.

The inverters passed every performance test. Security testing found something else.

At a glance
Organisation	A developer (“Devco C”) commissioning a new solar and storage park
Threat	An undocumented cellular module that could bypass site firewalls
Why it is new	Equipment inspection is now part of procurement
Codec Networks services	Equipment inspection, supply-chain assessment, procurement policy (Bundles B1, B9, B5)

The scenario

Devco C imported inverters for a new park and added security inspection to commissioning for the first time.

Testers found an undocumented cellular module capable of communicating outside the site network.

Devco C quarantined the equipment, engaged the supplier and changed its procurement policy.

Figure 10: Illustrative attack path for Case Study 3 and the controls that break it.

What went wrong

• No inspection requirement in earlier procurements.
• Contracts lacked security clauses.
• Site networks did not allow-list communications.
• No SBOM or component list from the supplier.

The impact

Devco C delayed commissioning but avoided deploying equipment with an unmanaged communication path.

The regulatory lens

• CEA Regulations 2026 (as reported): vendor accountability and OT protection.
• Ministry of Power guidance: testing of imported power-system equipment.
• Contracts: supplier security obligations.

How Codec Networks would help

Need	Codec Networks response	Bundle
Inspect equipment	Hardware and firmware inspection	B1
Assess suppliers	Supply-chain and OEM assessment	B9
Fix procurement	Security requirements in procurement	B5

Key lessons Inspect equipment before deployment. Put security in supply contracts. Allow-list site communications. Ask suppliers for component lists.

The login page was public. The password was in the manual.

At a glance
Organisation	A storage operator (“Storeco D”) running a grid-scale battery
Threat	An internet-reachable EMS interface with default credentials
Why it is new	Storage control affects safety and grid services
Codec Networks services	Exposure scanning, EMS/BMS testing, monitoring (Bundles B1, B3, B7)

The scenario

Storeco D's EMS web interface was reachable from the internet for remote support, and default credentials had never been changed.

An attacker found it through scanning, logged in and changed charge and discharge settings.

Battery operation was disrupted, and Storeco D launched a safety review and reported the incident.

Figure 11: Illustrative attack path for Case Study 4 and the controls that break it.

What went wrong

• EMS was exposed to the internet.
• Default credentials remained.
• No monitoring of EMS changes.
• Safety interlocks had not been reviewed.

The impact

Storeco D lost grid service revenue, faced a safety investigation and rebuilt remote access.

The regulatory lens

• CEA Regulations 2026 (as reported): OT separation from the internet and six-hour incident reporting for storage of 50 MW and above.
• CERT-In Directions: incident reporting.
• Grid service contracts: availability obligations.

How Codec Networks would help

Need	Codec Networks response	Bundle
Find exposure	External exposure scanning and EMS/BMS testing	B1
Fix access	Remote access and credential hardening	B3
Watch changes	OT monitoring of EMS settings	B7

Key lessons Never expose EMS to the internet. Change default credentials. Monitor control changes. Review safety interlocks.

The update reached thousands of meters overnight.

At a glance
Organisation	An AMI service provider (“Meterco E”) serving a DISCOM
Threat	An attacker altering unsigned meter firmware on a compromised update system
Why it is new	Meter updates can affect supply and billing at scale
Codec Networks services	Update security review, head-end testing, incident response (Bundles B2, B1, B8)

The scenario

Meterco E's update system pushed firmware without cryptographic signing.

An attacker who compromised the update server altered the firmware before a scheduled rollout.

Thousands of meters malfunctioned, disrupting supply for some consumers and corrupting billing data.

Figure 12: Illustrative attack path for Case Study 5 and the controls that break it.

What went wrong

• Firmware was not signed or verified.
• The update server was poorly protected.
• Rollout was not staged.
• No rollback plan existed.

The impact

Meterco E faced DISCOM penalties, consumer complaints and regulatory scrutiny.

The regulatory lens

• DISCOM contracts: security, availability and reporting obligations for AMISPs.
• CERT-In Directions: incidents reported within six hours.
• DPDP Act and Rules: consumer data safeguards once provisions commence.

How Codec Networks would help

Need	Codec Networks response	Bundle
Secure updates	Signing and update process review	B2
Test the AMI	Head-end and update server testing	B1
Respond	Incident response and recovery	B8

Key lessons Sign and verify meter firmware. Harden update servers. Stage rollouts. Keep rollback ready.

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